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*

INTRODUCTION

Treasury Regulation §1.162-5 allows an individual to deduct educational
expenditures as ordinary and necessary business expenses provided those expenditures maintain or improve skills required in his trade or business, or meet
express employer requirements imposed as a condition to the retention of an
established employment relationship, status, or rate of compensation.' However, no deduction is allowed for education expenditures necessary to meet
the minimum educational requirements for employment qualification in the
individual's trade or business. Nor will a deduction be permitted for educational expenditures which are part of a program of study which will qualify
the individual in a new trade or business.2 Thus, to be deductible such expenses
must be employment-related rather than personal and must constitute current
expenses rather than capital expenditures. Under current Internal Revenue
Service policy if an employer directly provides or reimburses an employee for
educational expenses, this educational assistance is excludable from the employee's income if the expenses would qualify for a deduction under Regulation § 1.162-5.3
Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code, added by the Revenue Act of
1978, allows a specific statutory exclusion from income for the value of
assistance provided by an employer to an employee under an educational
assistance program meeting certain requirements. If the requirements of this
section are met, the exclusion is available even if the education provided
would not qualify for a deduction under Regulation §1.162-5.
Section 117 of the Code provides for the exclusion from gross income of
scholarship and fellowship grants. The scope and purpose of this section is
quite different from Code section 127 or Regulation §1.162-5.
It is the purpose of this article to explore the present tax treatment of
educational costs and suggest some changes within the existing framework.
However, current legislative proposals that would give some form of subsidy
for personally incurred educational costs through the tax system or by other
means are beyond the scope of this article.
*B.S., Fordham University, 1961; J.D., Stanford University, 1964; LL.M., Tax, New York
University, 1965. Professor of Law Williamette University College of Law.
1. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(1), (2). I.R.C. §212 (expenses for production of income) has not been
used as a basis for deducting educational expenses. "[E]xpenses of taking special courses or

training" are expressly disallowed.
2. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2), (3).
3. Rev. Rul. 76-62, 1976-1 C.B. 12, Rev. Rul. 76-71, 1976-1 C.B. 808.
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DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES

There is no specific provision in the Internal Revenue Code authorizing a
deduction for educational expenses. For many years it was the position of
the Service and the courts that such expenses were nondeductible. 4 However,
in the early 1950s two circuit court decisions, Hill v. Commissioners and
Coughlin v. Commissioner,6 permitted the deduction of educational expenses
as trade or business expenses under Code section 162(a). In Hill, a teacher
seeking renewal of her teaching certificate was permitted to deduct summer
school expenses incurred to meet the renewal requirement. In Coughlin, a
lawyer was allowed a business expense deduction for attending a federal tax
institute on the basis that the expense was incurred to maintain skills needed
in the taxpayer's business. Thus, the ban on expense deductions was relaxed
when the taxpayer was already engaged in a trade or profession.
In 1958 the Treasury, for the first time, promulgated regulations setting
forth its position on the deductibility of educational expenses.7 These regulations, in line with the Hill and Coughlin decisions, established two categories
of deductible educational expenses. A deduction would be permitted where
the education was undertaken primarily (1) to maintain or to improve skills
required in the taxpayer's employment or other trade or business or (2) to
meet express requirements as a condition to retention in an established employment relationship.8 No deduction was allowed if the education was undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement in the same occupation. Deduction was also denied if the education
was undertaken to meet the minimum requirements for qualification or establishment in the taxpayer's trade or business."
To determine whether deduction of educational expenditures should be
allowed when expenditures fell within both deductible and nondeductible
categories, the 1958 Regulations adopted a "primary purpose" test. If the
taxpayer established that his primary purpose in incurring educational expenses was the maintenance of employment skills, he was entitled to the deduction even though the education qualified him for a new position.10 In 1967
the educational expense regulations were amended to provide that an expenditure would not be allowed if it fell within a nondeductible category even
though it also met the requirements of one of the deductible categories. With
this change, the taxpayer must satisfy two tests before he will be allowed a
deduction. First, the educational expenditure must come within a deductible
category, and second, the expenditure must not fall within a nondeductible
category. The taxpayer's motive in obtaining the education is no longer
relevant. Thus, expenditures which meet minimum education requirements
4. T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926); O.D. 892, 1921-4 C.B. 209; O.D. 984, 1921-5
C.B. 171.
5. 181F.2d 906, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 9310 (4th Cir. 1950), rev'g, 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
6. 203 F.2d 307, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 9321 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g, 18 T.C. 528 (1952).
7. Reg. §1.162-5; T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63.
8. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(1), (2).
9. Reg. §1.162-5(b).
10. Id.
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or qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business are nondeductible under
the current regulations, even though the taxpayer's primary purpose was to
maintain or improve skills or to meet his employer's express requirements.'
From the outset, the deductibility of educational expenses has depended
on the relationship of the expense to the taxpayer's trade or business. Personal
educational expenses are nondeductible. In addition, the usual limitation
placed on the deductibility of business expenditures under Code section
162(a), namely that they constitute current expenses and not capital expenditures, is applicable to costs incurred for educational purposes.
Deductible Categoriesof Education
Expenses under Regulation §1 162-5
Regulation § 1.162-5 established categories of deductible and nondeductible
educational expenses which have rarely been questioned by the courts.12 For
this reason the discussion of the scope of the deduction will follow the format
set out in the Regulations. 8
The first category of deductible educational expenses set forth in the Regulations is education which "maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his employment or other trade or business .... " 14 The Regulations
state that this category includes "refresher courses or courses dealing with
current developments as well as academic or vocational courses provided the
expenditures for the courses are not within either category of nondeductible
expenditures.... ."15
The Regulations do not explain the proximate relationship which must
exist between the education and the job skills. This standard has been developed by the courts, particularly the Tax Court. A frequently cited authority
which deals with this question is the case of James A. Carroll,6 in which a
police detective claimed a deduction for tuition towards a philosophy degree
since the education maintained or improved skills used in his trade. The Tax
Court held "that before expenses will be considered ordinary and necessary
under section 162, it must be established that they bear a proximate and
direct relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business."' 7 While agreeing that
11. Reg. §1.162-5(a).
12. In a significant number of the cases involving the deduction for educational expenses,
taxpayers have chosen to represent themselves. This is understandable since the amount of
potential tax liability is usually too small to warrant employment of counsel. Almost all
taxpayers have sought a judicial determination of tax liability before paying the tax by
instituting suit in the Tax Court rather than the Federal District Courts or the Court of
Claims. Because of the highly factual nature of most of these cases, many are memorandum
decisions of the Tax Court. Relatively few have been appealed.
13. The portions of Reg. §1.162-5 dealing with travel as a form of education and travel
expenses to obtain education are beyond the scope of this article. See generally Reg.
§1.162-5(d), (e).

14. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(1).
15. Reg. §1.162-5(c)(1).
16. 51 T.C. 213 (1968), aft'd, 418 F.2d 91, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. J9691 (7th Cir. 1969).
-17. Id. at 218. The court cited Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153, 1 U.S.T.C.

%284 (1928), a general §162 case for this point. This proximate and direct relationship'

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

the education might help him be a better policeman, it lacked this proximate
relationship.18 Thus the Service and the courts will make a very specific factual
inquiry into the nature of the skills needed in the existing employment, trade
or business, as well as an examination of the content of the educational courses
to determine whether a direct and proximate relationship exists.19
Deductions have been allowed where the education is extensive, concentrated and of an advanced nature.20 Of course, the taxpayer may have more
difficulty showing the relevance of the course work in this situation. An additional threat in such cases is that the extensive course of study will be held to
qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business, causing the deduction to come
within a category of nondeductible educational expenses. The nondeductible
categories of educational expenses will be fully discussed later in this article. "
Two cases in which taxpayers have been able to show that extensive education was directly related to their current trade or business are Cosimo A.
standard has generally been applied by the Service ("If the studies do not bear a direct
relationship to present duties, no deduction would be allowable." Internal Revenue Manual
4234 §77(12) (10/4/76)) and the courts ("It has become established that the revised regulations do not allow a deduction for educational expenses that are only tenuously, and not
proximately and directly related to a taxpayer's job skills." Alexander E. Baker, Jr., 30
T.C.M. 1192, 1196 (CCH 1971)).
18. 51 T.C. at 218. The court concluded that the education in question was designed to
increase the taxpayer's general understanding and competency and was too remote and
tenuously related to his employment to allow the deduction. Since this taxpayer failed to
establish the necessary proximate relationship between his job and a general college education, it was this lack of proximity rather than the extent of the education which was the
basis for denying the deduction. Id. at 218 n.3. Apparently, courses such as police-community
relations or constitutional rights of criminal suspects, provided they were not part of a
program of study which qualified him for a new trade or business, would have been deductible. See Carroll v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 91, 95, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9691 (7th Cir. 1969).
The Tax Court expressed the view that a general college education is so "inherently
personal" that there would be a rare set of circumstances under which it could be deductible
as an ordinary business expense. But see John D. Glasgow, 31 T.C.M. 310 (CCH 1972),
aJ'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 1045, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9773 (10th Cir. 1973) (minister allowed
to deduct a liberal arts education where the majority of courses were directly related to
ministry skills).
Under the current Regulations it would be very difficult for a taxpayer to obtain a deduction for a general college education since he must show not only that the education is
proximately related to his existing trade or business, but also that it is not part of a program of study which qualifies him for a new trade or business (alternative holding in
Carroll). In addition, the education may not be required for him to meet the minimum
educational requirements for qualification in his trade or business. See, e.g., Ronald E.
Garwood, 62 T.C. 699 (1974). But see Toner v. Commissioner, F.2d -,
1980-2 U.S.T.C.
9507 (3d Cir. 1980).
19. E.g., John M. McIlvoy, 38 T.C.M. 987 (CCH 1979). In Mcllvoy the taxpayer, an
engineer, was denied deductions for courses in accounting, marketing, organizational management and economic analysis but allowed a deduction for courses in high frequency transistor
circuits and transistor design. The taxpayer's work Commissioner, 141 F.2d 204, 205, 1944-1
U.S.T.C. 9233 (5th Cir. 1944) (objective of hobby is pleasure or relaxation). A definition
along these lines seems to carry out the congressional intent. A definition which treats as a
hobby any activity that is not business or profit motivated would seem to be too narrow.
But see I.R.C. §183 (deductions disallowed for expenses due to not for profit activities).
20. The current Regulations state explicitly that a deduction will not be denied solely
because the education results in a degree. Reg. §1.162-5(a).
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Carlucci21 and Sabino F. Ciociari.22 In Carlucci, an industrial psychologist
was able to deduct the costs of obtaining a Ph.D. degree in industrial psychology,- while the Ciociaricourt allowed an assistant for the New York City
Housing Authority a deduction for courses leading to a Master's degree in
Public Administration. 24 In both cases, under the 1958 Regulations, the
government unsuccessfully argued that even if the education maintained or
improved skills, the primary purpose was substantial advancement in position.
These courts noted that while over the long term the taxpayer might expect
that the education would result in some advancement, he was not attempting

to qualify for any specific position either with his current employer or else25

where.
A deduction for expenses to maintain or improve skills requires the taxpayer to be engaged in a trade or business at the time he undertakes the
education. 2 Professional status in and of itself is not a sufficient basis to
conclude that the taxpayer is "carrying on a trade or business" within the
21. 37 T.C. 695 (1962).

22. 22 T.C.M. 784 (CCH 1963). In Ciorciari, which the court characterized as a close
case, it was important that there was "no new position or substantial advancement automatically accruing to a person in petitioner's position who obtained an advanced degree."
Id. at 784.
Under the 1958 Regulations, if the courses for which the deduction was sought had satisfied the express requirements of a new position this would have been an important factor
indicating that the education was undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining such
position. See Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958) (now Reg. §1.162-5(a)-(c)). Under the 1967 Regulations,
if the education had qualified either taxpayer for a new trade or business, the deduction
would be automatically denied. See Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1967) (now Reg. §1.162-5(a)-(c)). Both
taxpayers had met minimal educational requirements for their positions, so this was not
at issue in either case. See also Rev. Rul. 69-199, 1969-1 C.B. 51 (Navy personnel officer
allowed deduction for courses leading to a Master of Arts degree in Personnel Administration); Rev. Rul. 68-580, 1968-2 C.B. 72 (deduction allowed an education professor who
obtained a doctorate to remain eligible for a junior college presidency, since the courses
maintained skills and under liberal Reg. §1.162-5(b) the education did not qualify him for
a new trade or business).
23. 37 T.C. at 702.
24. 22 T.C.M. at 785.
25. Taxpayers have also been successful where the issue was whether the expense was
primarily personal or recreational, and therefore not sufficiently related to the trade or
business. See, e.g., Alan Aaronson, 29 T.C.M. 786 (CCH 1970) (newspaper photographer who
also operated freelance on his own time allowed to deduct the cost of flying lessons when he
established that the ability to fly his own plane improved the timeliness and increased the
range and quality of his pictures); Keith W. Shaw, 28 T.C.M. 626 (CCH 1969) (Federal
Aviation Agency medical examiner allowed a deduction for expenses incurred in taking
flying lessons when there was a sufficient nexus between maintaining his own proficiency
in flying and his job of passing upon the qualifications of others). But see William B. Crashley,
39 T.C.M. 775 (CCH 1979) (personal leadership course taken by a professional hockey player
was held not to be sufficiently related to skills needed in his business to warrant a deduction).
26. Expenses "paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business"
are deductible. For purposes of this section "trade or business" is commonly defined as
"extensive activity over a period of time for the purpose of producing income." C. Fink
Fischer, 50 T.C. 164, 171 (1968). It is well established that an employee may be in a trade
or business. David Primuth, 54 T.C. 874, 377-78 (1970); Leonard F. Cremora, 58 T.C. 219
(1972).
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meaning of Code section 162.27 For example, in Richard M. Randick,2 a law
school graduate took and passed his state bar examination and then immediately enrolled in a graduate law program in taxation without first engaging in
law practice. The graduate school expenses were held to be nondeductible
since the taxpayer, though a lawyer, had not entered into that trade or
2
business when the education was undertaken. 9
It is not uncommon for a person clearly engaged in a trade or business to
leave for a period of time in order to obtain more education in his field. This
factual pattern has caused a considerable amount of litigation. In Furner v.
Commissioner,30 a junior high school teacher resigned to spend a year doing
graduate work toward a Master's Degree after which she returned to teaching.
The Seventh Circuit held that she was entitled to the deduction over the
Service's objection that she was not currently engaged in a trade or business.
After the Furner decision, however, the Service published a revenue ruling3'
announcing that they would follow Furner where the temporary cessation of
the business activity was for a period of one year or less and the taxpayer
returned to the same trade or business. No formal leave of absence from the
former employment is required. As long as the taxpayer resumes the same trade
32
or business, it need not be with the same employer.
The second category of deductible educational expenses set forth in the
Regulations are those which meet "the express requirements of the individual's
employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a
27. Henry G. Owen, 23 T.C. 377, 380 (1954).
28. 35 T.C.M. 195, 198 (CCH 1976). Accord, Paul R. Wassenaar, 72 T.C. 1195 (1979).
Denial of a deduction on this basis is to be distinguished from denial because the education
is part of the minimum educational requirements for qualification in a trade or business.
29. See also Albert C. Ruehmann, III, 30 T.C.M. 675 (CCH 1971). The court in Randick
distinguished Albert C. Ruehmann, III (a deduction was allowed for the expenses of a
graduate law degree, since there the taxpayer had worked as a lawyer for three months before
beginning the graduate program and was treated as engaged in a trade or business). But see
Barry Reisine, 29 T.C.M. 1429 (CCH 1970) (engineering graduate employed as an engineer
for one year could not deduct graduate study in engineering because he was not sufficiently
established as an engineer to be engaged in a trade or business).
30. 393 F.2d 292, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9234 (7th Cir. 1968). Accord, Ford v. Commissioner, 487
F.2d 1025, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. %9 77 8 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'g, 56 T.C. 1300 (1971).
31. Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 C.B. 73.
32. The courts have allowed a deduction beyond the one-year period suggested by
Rev. Rul. 68-591. See Stephen G. Sherman, 36 T.C.M. 1191 (CCH 1977) (deduction allowed
for two year period and taxpayer did not return to his previous position); Robert John
Picknally, 36 T.C.M. 1292 (CCH 1977) (expenses deductible where taxpayer held to be
carrying on trade or business of being an educator where despite long period of unemployment he was actively seeking work). But see Mathew J. Reisinger, 71 T.C. 569 (1979) (deduction denied where suspension period was for seven years and taxpayer did not start education
until five years after resigning prior position); Peter G. Corbett, 55 T.C. 884 (1971) (German
teacher no longer carrying on the business of teaching when, after resigning to take graduate courses, she was absent from work for four years); Estate of Sussman, 37 T.C.M. 1430
(CCH 1978) (expenses to enable retired CPA to resume active conduct of profession at unspecified future date not deductible); Rev. Rul. 77-32, 1977-1 C.B. 38 (deduction denied an
anesthesiologist for educational expenses incurred during period he had ceased practice due
to high malpractice rates. Expenses were incurred only in preparation for return to practice
at some indefinite future date).
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condition to the retention by the individual of an established employment relationship, status, or rate of compensation." 33
Courts have concluded that since the education was taken to meet the
express requirements of an existing employment relationship, the expenses
were neither capital nor personal in nature but rather ordinary and necessary
business expenses.3 4 This category of the deduction has been -limited to the
education necessary to meet the express requirements of the taxpayer's employer; 35 mere encouragement by the employer or a general direction to improve performance will not be sufficient. 6
The Regulations caution that the express requirements of the employer
37
be imposed "for a bona fide business purpose of the individual's employer."
Also, only the minimum education necessary to the retention of the established
employment relationship will be considered as undertaken to meet the express
requirements of the taxpayer's employer, although additional education may
qualify as maintaining or improving skills3 8 Education required for a valid
business reason of the employer in most cases would maintain or improve
skills required for the taxpayer in his employment. This category, therefore,
does not significantly enlarge the types of educational expenses which are deductible.
There is an additional caveat: if the required education is part of the

minimum requirements for the initial qualification for the taxpayer's employment, no deduction is allowed 3 9 This factual determinationo is the
major issue in most cases involving this category of deductible educational
expenses and is discussed further in conjunction with the minimum requirements category of nondeductible educational expenses.41
33. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(2).
34. E.g., Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 19310 (4th Cir. 1950).
35. William Kinch, 30 T.C.M. 502 (CCH 1971). Because the Air Force encouraged, but
did not require, officers to obtain college degrees, deductions for educational expenses were
disallowed. As to the alternate basis for deductibility, the taxpayer in Kinch offered no
evidence showing how the education maintained or improved skills. Id. at 505.
86. Lawrence H. Bakken, 51 T.C. 603 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 435 F.2d 1306, 1971-1
U.S.T.C. 9188 (9th Cir. 1971). In Bakken, an engineer enrolled in law school to improve
his ability to reason and communicate. Though his enrollment was in response to a poor
performance report it was not specifically required by his employer. Consequently, the
deduction was denied. No argument was made that the education maintained or improved
skills. See id. Under the current Regulations the deduction would be denied because the
courses qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business. See Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3).
37. Reg. §1.162-5(c)(2).
38. Id. A more relaxed view of the education required for retention category was
taken in Ruth D. Truxall, 21 T.C.M. 726 (CCH 1962). In Truxall, the taxpayer took courses
to obtain a salary increase conditioned on additional education. The court reasoned that this
system, which withheld normal salary increases from those who did not further their education, created a requirement for additional education to retain taxpayer's present position. Id.
at 727. See also Marvin L. Lund, 46 T.C. 321 (1966).
39. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2).
40. See Laurie S. Robertson, 37 T.C. 1153, 1160 (1962).
41. See text accompanying notes 42-52 infra. Of course, required additional education
may be nondeductible on the grounds that it qualifies taxpayer for a new trade or business.
Henry C. Reinhard, Jr., 34 T.C.M. 1529 (CCH 1975).
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Nondeductible EducationalExpenditures
- Minimum EducationalRequirements
General Rules
The first category of nondeductible educational expenses in the current
Regulations is "expenditures made by an individual for education which is
required of him in order to meet the minimum educational requirements for
qualification in his employment or other trade or business.'"' Minimum education required is to be determined "from a consideration of such factors as
the requirements of the employer, the applicable law and regulations, and
the standards of the profession, trade, or business involved."3 An individual
need only meet these minimum educational requirements once. Having entered
the business, the taxpayer is treated as continuing to meet the minimum re4
quirements even though they may have been changed. 4
The fact that an individual is already employed does not necessarily indicate that he has met the minimum educational requirements to qualify him
for that job.4 5 For example, an individual who has completed two years of a
normal three-year law school curriculum and is hired by a law firm to do legal
research on a full-time basis, may be offered continued employment contingent
on acquiring a degree and passing the state bar examination. The individual
completes law school at night and takes a bar review course to prepare for the
bar examination. No deduction would be allowed for these expenses because
the education is required to meet the minimum educational requirements for
qualification in his trade or business. 6
Satisfying Minimum EducationalRequirements
- Special Treatment for School Teachers
The 1967 Regulations illustrate the government's recognition that the
necessity for continuing education of teachers would be a constant source of
litigation unless some rather specific rules were drawn.4 7 In particular, since
this area may require education of one already in the profession, the Regulations attempt to differentiate between the deductible education expenses for a
teacher and nondeductible education which is required to meet the "minimum
42. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i). The 1958 Regulatiors also flatly denied a deduction for such
educational expenses on the basis that they were personal in nature. Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958)
(now Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i)).
43. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), ex. 3. In Albert C. Ruehmann, III, 30 T.C.M. 675, 679 (CCH
1971), the taxpayer had already met the minimum requirements to practice law in Georgia
after two years of law school but was still disallowed a deduction for his third year as completion of a legal education was customarily required of a lawyer to meet minimum requirements for qualification for employment in the type of law firm in which he was
employed.
47. The 1958 Regulations on the deductibility of education expenses for teachers were
quite general, although some details were added by rulings. See Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1
C.B. 69.
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educational requirements for qualification as a teacher."48 Regulation
§1.162-5(b)(2)(ii) provides that the minimum requirement for a teaching
position is the minimum level of education normally required of an individual
initially employed in such a position. However, a teacher has not satisfied
minimum educational requirements merely by performing teaching services
when the individual was hired only because there were not enough applicants
with the usual qualifications. 9
Beyond the elementary and secondary school level it is less likely there will
be state or local government regulations of minimum educational requirements. In such cases, the Regulations state that an individual has met the
minimum requirements when he becomes a member of the faculty. ° This determination is to be made on the basis of practices of the particular institution. However, an individual will ordinarily be considered to be a member of
the faculty if (1)he has tenure or his years of service are being counted toward
obtaining tenure; (2) the institution is making contributions to a retirement
plan (other than social security or a similar program) for his employment; or
(3) he has a vote in faculty affairs. 51 This is an attempt to draw a line between
regular faculty - assistant, associate or full professors - and the more temporary
status of those seeking appointment to the permanent staff, such as instructors,
teaching assistants, graduate instructors, and the equivalent. An example in
the Regulations deals with an individual who obtains temporary employment
as an instructor at a university and may hold the position only so long as he
shows satisfactory progress in courses toward obtaining a required graduate
degree. He may become a faculty member only if he obtains a graduate degree.
The courses taken constitute minimum education for qualification as a permanent faculty member and are not deductible. Implicit in this problem is
that the temporary position of instructor is not his trade or business and that
he has not yet satisfied the minimum requirement for which the graduate
degree requirement was imposed.52
Qualification for New Trade or Business
The second category of nondeductible educational expenses set forth in
48. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(iii). The Regulations illustrate these minimum education requirements by very specific and detailed exampples. Once the individual has satisfied minimum
educational requirements, the teacher may deduct expenses of additional education necessary
to retain that position. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i), ex. 1, situations 1 and 2; see also Rev. Rul. 7158, 1971-1 C.B. 55 (education allowed teacher for expenses necessary to meet teaching requirements of another state to which she moved).
49. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i), ex. 1, situation 3. The points illustrated are applicable to nonteachers as well.
50. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(il).
51. Id.

52. See Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), ex. 2. See also Arthur M. Jungreis, 55 T.C. 581 (1970)
(teaching assistant denied deduction for cost of obtaining Ph.D. degree which enabled him
to meet the minimum educational requirements to become a permanent member of the
faculty). Alternatively, if the taxpayer is considered to be in a trade or business as an instructor, the costs of the graduate degree would be nondeductible, as qualifying him for a
new trade or business. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3).
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the Regulations are "expenditures made by an individual for education which
is part of a program of study being pursued by him which will lead to qualifying him in a new trade or business."'s The current Regulations' use of objective
criteria for qualification in a new trade or business replaces the former subjective standard which looked to the taxpayer's primary purpose in obtaining
the education.5 4 The objective approach has significantly narrowed the allowable deduction. Under the current Regulations, it is not relevant that the
education also improve skills used in the taxpayer's current trade or business
or that he never entered and never intended to enter the new trade or business
he has qualified for.
Although the change to objective standards was prompted by the hope
that litigation would thereby be substantially reduced, this has not proven to
be the case. One reason is that the essential question, namely whether the taxpayer has qualified for a new trade or business, is a question of fact. 55 Some
help in making this determination is given by the Regulations. In the case
of an employee, a change of duties does not constitute a new trade or business
"if the new duties involve the same general type of work as is involved in the
individual's present employment." 56 The Regulations specifically deal with the
teaching profession, stating that for this purpose all teaching and related duties
shall be considered to involve the same general type of work. Examples are
given of changes in teaching duties which do not constitute new trades or
businesses: a change from elementary to secondary school classroom teacher,
from mathematics to science teacher, from classroom teacher to guidance
counselor, and from classroom teacher to principal.5 7 This rule is obviously
very liberal with respect to teachers. In contrast, the "new trade or business"
portion of the 1967 Regulations has virtually eliminated any deduction for the
expenses of attending law school. 58 This development will be discussed
separately.
It is unfortunate that the Regulations are not more detailed with respect
to criteria to be used by the courts in making a determination as to what
constitutes a new trade or business in situations not involving teachers or
53. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3)(i).
54. "Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are not deductible if they are
for education undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement in position, or primarily for the purpose of fulfilling the general
educational aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer." Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958)
(now Reg. §1.162-5(a)-(c)). While it might appear that "a new trade or business" would involve
a more significant change in duties or functions than "a new position or substantial advancement in position," the cases, other than those concerning teachers, do not seem to have
considered this change in the language of the Regulations significant.
55. Kenneth C. Davis, 65 T.C. 1014 (1976).
56. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3)(i).
57. Id. This liberal rule, that all teaching and related duties shall be considered to
involve the same general type of work and, hence, the same trade or business, applies only
after the taxpayer has met the minimum requirements to become a member of the teaching
profession. Thus, a shift from a teaching assistant or temporary status to regular faculty
status will constitute a new trade or business. Leonarda C. Diaz, 70 T.C. 1067 (1978). See also
Ronald E. Garwood, 62 T.C. 699 (1974).

58. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), ex. 1 and 2.
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lawyers. Left without significant guidelines, the Tax Court has adopted what
it terms a "common sense approach," namely, "if the education qualifies the
taxpayer to perform significantly different tasks and activities than he or she
could perform prior to the education, then the education qualifies him or her
for a new trade or business." 59 For example, in William D. Glenr60 the Tax
Court held that a licensed public accountant in Tennessee is in a different
trade or business from a certified public accountant in Tennessee. The court
investigated the scope of practice of each profession and found as a fact that
in Tennessee there is a significant difference between the potential practice, of
a public accountant and that of a C.P.A.1 Therefore, the expenses of a C.P.A.
exam review course were nondeductible as part of the program of study used
to prepare this licensed public accountant for a new trade or business. As
might be expected from the factual nature of the issue, taxpayers have
continued to litigate the same question where they believed the differences in
practice in their particular state were not significant enough to constitute a
62
new trade or business.
In areas other than the teaching profession, the courts have generally
viewed the taxpayer's trade or business quite narrowly and have frequently
denied the educational expense deduction, finding that the education imparted
skills which constituted qualification for a new trade or business. 63 For example,
in the recent case of Yvan Roussel,64 the Tax Court applied the Regulations' objective standard and denied the deduction for instruction leading to
a commercial pilot's certificate since the education qualified the taxpayers, a
flight engineer employed as a ground school instructor, in the new trade or
59. Leonarda C. Diaz, 70 T.C. 1067, 1074 (1978), aff'd without separate opinion, 607 F.2d
955, 1979-2 U.S.T.C. %9473 (2d Cir. 1979).
60. 62 T.C. 270 (1974).
61. Id. at 277. The court found the ability of a CPA to undertake a tax practice as an
especially significant difference. Id. at 276.
62. Accord, David Cooper, 37 T.C.M. 529 (CCH 1978) (Idaho CPAs in 1973 performed
sufficiently different tasks from those who practiced accounting without certification, so as to
constitute new trade or business); Howard S. Cooper, 38 T.C.M. 955 (CCH 1979) (an unlicensed accountant different trade or business from CPA in Connecticut). As with so many
cases in this area, litigation also continues because taxpayers refuse to accept that their intent
not to change their practice or profession, as shown by their continued employment in the
same capacity, is irrelevant. See, e.g., Velma Archie, 37 T.C.M. 1759, 1762 (CCH 1978).
63. E.g., Duane F. Thorbahn, 38 T.C.M. 342 (CCH 1979) (a B.S. in psychology obtained
by a registered nurse qualified her for counseling and administrative positions, therefore a
new trade or business); Mathew J. Reisinger, 71 T.C. 568 (1979) (a physician's assistant is a
different trade or business from that of a practical nurse because of the separate statutory
classification of the two jobs); Leonarda C. Diaz, 70 T.C. 1068 (1978) (paraprofessional
teaching assistant to regular classroom teacher was a new trade or business), aff'd, 607 F.2d
995, 1979-2 U.S.T.C. %9473 (2d Cir. 1979); Myron Burnstein, 66 T.C. 492 (1976) (an employment switch from counseling children with learning disabilities to social worker held to be a
new trade or business); Gary Antzoulatos, 84 T.C.M. 1426 (CCH 1975) (a registered pharmacist
is in a different trade or business from an intern pharmacist, even though latter could perform
many of the same tasks under supervision); Wayne L. Wentworth, 33 T.C.M. 128 (CCH
1974) (required training by highway technical-trainee Grade 05 qualified him as Grade 07,
a new trade or business).
64. 38 T.C.M. 565 (CCH 1979).
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business of being a commercial pilot. The court noted that because the taxpayer lacked an airline transport pilot certificate, an instrument rating, and
had relatively few hours of flight time, he was "a very unlikely candidate to
be embarking on a career as a commercial pilot ... "66 However, the court also
noted that the taxpayer might engage in some crop dusting and aerial photography, and take passengers for short joyrides on sunny days. Other examples of
this narrow interpretation are the cases holding that educational expenses of
a lawyer admitted in one state, to prepare for a bar examination in another
67
state, are nondeductible on new trade or business grounds.
Specialty Education
The 1967 Regulations are more liberal than the 1958 Regulations in
allowing a deduction for the expenses of qualifying for a new specialty within
one's trade or business. The 1958 Regulations denied a deduction to a general
practitioner of medicine for a course of study undertaken to become a
specialist in pediatrics. 68 The current Regulations permit a psychiatrist to
deduct the cost of a program of study and training which would qualify him
to practice psychoanalysis, since this would not qualify him for a new trade or
business. 69 This example involved a taxpayer who took the specialty training
while continuing his full-time practice. However, continuation of a full-time
practice does not seem to be required since the Service has ruled that a dentist
engaged in a general practice who returned to dental school full time for
postgraduate training as an orthodontist while continuing his dental practice
on a part-time basis could also deduct the costs of such education. 70 Where the
taxpayer has ceased his trade or business entirely in order to train and study
in the new specialty, however, the cases and rulings require that the cessation
of business activity be only "temporary" if he is to be considered engaged in a
trade or business. 71 In the area of specialty education taken immediately
following a basic professional degree, the courts have denied the deduction
65. Id. Roussel had received the recurring complaint that he was unable to teach his
subjects from a pilot's point of view. After being threatened with dismissal because of this
criticism, the taxpayer began to take flying lessons, and the criticism ceased. In the process
of improving his teaching skills, the taxpayer obtained a commercial pilot's certificate which
allowed him to carry passengers for hire, but not at night or on cross country flights of
more than 50 nautical miles. There was no evidence to indicate that the taxpayer ever did
carry passengers for hire or otherwise perform as a commercial pilot. Id. at 566.
66. Id. at 567. The situations in which petitioner could earn a livelihood as a pilot were
limited, and it made no economic sense for him to pursue the career of a commercial pilot.
Id.
67. Joel A. Sharon, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273, 1978-2 U.S.T.C.
9834 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2883 (1979); Arthur E. Ryman, Jr., 51 T.C. 799
(1969).
68. Reg. §1.162-5(e), ex. 2 (1958).
69. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3), ex. 4 (1967). The example follows the decision in Greenberg v.
Commissioner, 367 F.2d 663, 1966-2 U.S.T.C. 9717 (1st Cir. 1966), which involves these
particular facts. One may question whether this is the best way to indicate a change in
position.
70. Reg. Rul. 74-78, 1974-1 C.B. 44.
71. See cases and ruling cited in notes 30-32 supra.
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either because the taxpayer was not "carrying on" a trade or business when
he obtained the specialty education, or because it was considered part of a
program of study qualifying him for a trade or business not previously

engaged

M

in.7

Because a specialty is part of the taxpayer's existing trade or business, it
does not seem to matter that after obtaining the education, the taxpayer devotes
his time exclusively to the specialty rather than using the training to enhance
the general practice in which he was previously engaged.-3 Of course, the

factual question remains as to whether the additional education merely
qualifies him for a specialty within his trade or business or constitutes a new
trade or business.

Lawyers
The 1967 Regulations, adopting a flat rule of disallowance for educational
expenses which qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business, have had a

dramatic impact on the deductibility of law school expenses.- Under the
1958 Regulations, taxpayers could deduct such expenses if they could show a
direct and proximate relationship between law school courses and the skills
needed in their current trade or business and that their primary purpose
in obtaining such education was to maintain and improve those skills rather
than to enter the new profession of law.75 The 1967 Regulations simplified
72. The courts on a number of occasions have not allowed a deduction for the costs of
a LL.M. degree obtained immediately after law school. The basis of these decisions is not
that the specialized law training (usually in taxation) qualified a taxpayer in a profession
other than law, but rather that he was not "firmly established" in the profession when the
course work was undertaken. Therefore, the education did not maintain skills used in
carrying on the business. See Paul R. Wassenaar, 72 T.C. 1195 (1979) (taxpayer who entered
a masters program in tax directly out of law school was merely continuing the pursuit of
becoming a lawyer, a new trade or business, and thus these expenses were nondeductible);
see also Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 9347 (E.D. La. 1971);
Richard M. Randick, 35 T.C.M. 195 (CCH 1976); Larry R. Adamson, 32 T.C.M. 107 (CCH
1973). But see Albert C. Ruehmann, III, 30 T.C.M. 675 (CCH 1971) (a newly admitted
attorney who had practiced for three months before leaving for a nine-month period to
obtain an LL.M. degree was held to be engaged in law practice at the time, and a deduction
for the cost of the graduate education was allowed).
73. In Rev. Rul. 74-78, 1974-1 C.B. 44, the favorable ruling involved a dentist who, after
his specialty training, limited his practice to orthodontic patients.
74. While the most common factual pattern involves taxpayers in one trade or business
who seek to deduct the cost of a legal education, the expenses of a law degree will also be
denied to one without a current trade or business that is part of the minimum educational
requirements for qualification in a trade or business. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), ex. 3.
75. See Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941, 61 U.S.T.C. 9307 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(forensic pathologist); Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 9789 (N.D.
Ohio 1962) (IRS special agent), afT'd, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Frank Kilgannon, 24
T.C.M. 619 (CCH 1965) (accountant); Milton L. Schultz, 23 T.C.M. 1372 (CCH 1964)
(revenue agent who examined estate and gift tax returns); Walter T. Charlton, 23 T.C.M.
420 (CCH 1964) (accountant); Richard Baum, 23 T.C.M. 206 (CCH 1964) (insurance
claims adjuster); William J. Brennan, 22 T.C.M. 1222 (CCHI 1963) (revenue agent who
examined estate and gift tax returns). Various taxpayers have been allowed to deduct the
cost of a legal education where the taxpayer was able to show that the education was
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matters; if the taxpayer has undertaken a program of law study which will or
may lead to qualifying him as a lawyer, none of the expenses of such study
are deductible educational expenses.- 6
The Regulations refer to expenditures which are "part of a program of
study" which will "lead to qualifying" the taxpayer in a new trade or business.
This language is broad enough to resist taxpayer arguments that a law degree
without passing a bar exam does not qualify one to be a lawyer.7 7 The wording
is also clearly aimed at denying a deduction claimed by the taxpayer at some
point short of graduation. Expenditures for individual law school courses
which meet one of the positive tests of deductibility, however, might be deductible if the student is not enrolled in a full or part-time program of study
leading to a law degree.

7

While the courts have consistently upheld the Regulations, litigation has
continued unabated.7 9 Taxpayers have raised a variety of arguments in attempts
to get around the rule, all without success.80 Some have argued unsuccessfully
proximately related to his current trade or business and that his primary purpose in obtaining
the education was not to practice law.
Numerous other taxpayers failed to sustain their burden of proof and were denied deduction, e.g., Robert H. Jones, 29 T.C.M. 866 (CCH 1970); Louis Aronin, 20 T.C.M. 909 (CCH
1961).
76. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3)(i), (ii), ex. 1 and 2. The denial of a deduction for law school
expenses, regardless of the taxpayer's purpose in undertaking such study, has been approved
consistently by the courts, especially the Tax Court. Patrick L. O'Donnell, 62 T.C. 781, 783
(1974), afJ'd without published opinion, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975); Morton S. Taubman,
60 T.C. 814, 819 (1973); David N. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357, 1361 (1971). The nondeductible program of study includes bar review courses. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2), ex. 3; Joel A. Sharon, 66 T.C.
515 (1976), af'd per curianz, 591 F.2d 1273, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. 9834 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 2883 (1979).
77. George H. Dinsmore, 36 T.C.M. 1008 (1977); Ronald F. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106,
1111 (1969) (unsuccessful arguments by taxpayers that the qualifying event for this new
trade or business was passing the bar examination, not graduation from law school).
78. Rev. Rul. 76-62, 1976-1 C.B. 12 holds that law school correspondence courses which
lead to a degree but do not entitle taxpayer to sit for any state bar examination are deductible. In Patrick L. O'Donnell, 62 T.C. 781 (1974), a tax accountant argued he should at
least be able to deduct the tax courses he took in law school. The court rejected this argument, stating that since these courses helped satisfy the J.D. degree requirements, their status
was indistinguishable from all of the other courses.
79. In Juanita F. Ardavany, 38 T.C.M. 569 (CCH 1979), the taxpayer taught secretarial
courses. She stopped teaching to attend law school to obtain training required to teach
business law courses. After graduation and passing the bar, she returned to teaching.
Deductions for her law courses were denied. See also Patrick L. Johnston, 37 T.C.M. 1112
(CCH 1978); David L. Reed, 37 T.C.M. 1508 (CCH 1978); George H. Dinsmore, 36 T.C.M.
1008 (CCH 1977); Orrin L. Grover, 68 T.C. 598 (1977); Kenneth G. Bouchard, 36 T.C.M.
1098 (CCH 1977); John E. Gates, 36 T.C.M. 970 (CCH) 1977); John V. McDermott, Jr., 36
T.C.M. 144 (CCH 1977); Patrick L. O'Donnell, 62 T.C. 781 (1974); Morton S. Taubman, 60
T.C. 814 (1973); David N. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971).
80. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Bouchard, 36 T.C.M. 1098 (CCH 1977) (teacher argued that
he came within the rule allowing educational deductions for teachers because he was simply
changing from a mathematics teacher to a law teacher); David L. Reed, 37 T.C.M. 1508 (CCH
1978) (educator maintained that the study of law was not a new trade or business but a
substantive academic discipline after which the taxpayer returned to college teaching and
never practiced law); Jeffrey L. Weller, 54 T.C. 398 (1970) (an accountant and IRS agent
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that the Regulation is invalid as inconsistent with the statute.,. Other taxpayers
have attacked the bias in the Regulation favoring teachers (and against those
who incur law school expenses) as violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and insist that exclusion of motive and intent as factors in determining the availability of the deduction is a violation of the due process
clause. The courts have not been receptive to any of these arguments.82
Teachers
Despite the detailed regulations concerning teachers, litigation by this
group has also continued. A substantial amount of such litigation has revolved
around whether the taxpayer comes within the liberal rule in the Regulations
which states that since all teaching duties involve the same general type of
work, a change in duties does not constitute a new trade or business.8 3
In Leonarda C. Diaz,8 4 the taxpayer was employed as a paraprofessional
educational associate. With the school system's encouragement she attended
college and obtained a Bachelor of Science Degree in Education. 5 The school's
objective was to upgrade and improve its paraprofessional employees' skills
and, in some instances, for them to obtain training leading to teacher certifica-

tion. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer's educational expenditures led
to her qualification in the new trade or business of classroom teacher and were
nondeductible personal expenses. Since the taxpayer was not previously a
licensed teacher, the court found that the liberal rule regarding shifts in teaching duties contained in the Regulations was not applicable to her. The fact
that she remained a paraprofessional after receiving the degree because she
did not pass the teacher's examination was held irrelevant.8 6 The fact that
she may have been performing services as a teacher prior to this time did not
establish that she had satisfied the minimum requirements for qualification as
a teacher. Diaz is a typical, if somewhat harsh, example of the treatment received by taxpayers who are teaching but are not yet fully qualified teachers.
The liberal statement in the Regulations is held not to apply to this group,
and the deduction is denied as falling within one or both nondeductible
categories.

argued his law school education was helpful in his existing trade or business of being a
federal income tax professional).
81. See, e.g., Ronald F. Weiszmann, 52 T.C. 1106 (1969), aff'd, 443 F.2d 29, 1971-1
U.S.T.C. 9312 (9th Cir. 1971); Melnik v. United States, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9521 (C.D. Cal.
1973), af'd per curiam, 521 F.2d 1065, 1975-2 U.S.T.C. %9702 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. E.g., Ronald F. Wieszmann, 52 T.C. 1106, aff'd, 443 F.2d 29, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. %9312
(9th Cir. 1971) (no violation of equal protection; classification justifiable); Melnik v. United
States, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 119521 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 521 F.2d 1065, 1975-2, 607 F.2d
995, U.S.T.C. 19702 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejection of due process argument).

83. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3)(i).
84. 70 T.C. 1067 (1978), af'd without separate opinion, 607 F.2d 995, 1979-2 U.S.T.C.

19473 (2d Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at 1070. As a paraprofessional employee, the taxpayer's advancement was largely
dependent upon college courses completed at accredited 1.niversitles. Id,
86. Id. at 1075-76.
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the court seemed at some points to blend the two
nondeductible categories together. In Davis, the taxpayer, Inger Davis, had
spent many years in the field of social work.88 Despite the length and variety
of her experience, she was not then qualified to become a member of the
faculty of the University of Chicago since she lacked the Ph.D. degree
normally required. While enrolled in a Ph.D. program, the taxpayer was employed as a nonfaculty lecturer at the university. Upon obtaining the Ph.D.
the taxpayer was appointed to a full-time faculty position. The court denied
the deduction for the expenses of obtaining the Ph.D. The court rejected the
argument that she had already met minimum educational requirements for a
faculty position since the position as lecturer was a nonfaculty position.8 9
The taxpayer also argued that she was already in the field of social work. The
court rejected this second argument, stating the deduction should still be
denied on the basis of Regulation §1.162-5(b)(2), since the education was
undertaken "not merely to continue the kind of social work performed by her
but qualified her to meet the minimum requirements of a new position in
that field."90
In this decision the court did not rely on the new trade or business category
of the Regulations or find that a practicing social worker was in a different
trade or business from a teacher in that field. Rather, it denied the deduction
where the education qualified her to meet the minimum requirements of a
"new position in that field." Where, as in Davis, the education was undertaken
for a position the taxpayer then entered, failure to keep the two categories
distinct may not lead to unfair results. If the taxpayer obtained a Ph.D. in her
subject, thereby improving her skills as a practitioner, would the court have
denied her a deduction because the Ph.D. happened to meet minimum requirements to be a university professor in the same field? Is not the minimum
education requirement limited to the minimum education required to enter
a trade or business which the taxpayer, in fact, enters? This question was faced
squarely by the Tax Court recently, in a somewhat different context, in Linda
M. Liberi Toner9 1
In Toner, the taxpayer incurred educational expenses to obtain a bachelor's
degree while employed as a lay teacher at a Catholic elementary school. The
minimum education required by her employer for full faculty status was a
high school diploma, but teachers without a bachelor's degree were required
to earn six hours of college credits each year until they obtained a college
degree. 2 Public and nonreligious private school teachers and virtually all
teachers in the Catholic high schools were required to have a college degree
when they were hired. Although the taxpayer received a state teaching
certificate along with her degree, she never applied for a teaching position in
In Kenneth C. Davis,

87. 65 T.C. 1014 (1976).
88. Id. at 1015. Davis had performed a variety of tasks in the field of social work,
including lecturing, casework and writing a textbook. Id.
89. Id. at 1019-20.
90. Id. at 1020.
91. 71 T.C. 772 (1979), rev'd, F.2d -, 1980-2 U.S.T.C. %9507 (3d Cir. 1980).
92. id. at 773.
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the public schools but continued to teach at the Catholic elementary school.
A five-member plurality of the Tax Court held that the taxpayer's educational
expenses were not deductible based on Regulation §1.162-5(b)(2) .g1They noted
that although she had already met the minimum educational requirements for
the position she held, the education enabled her to satisfy the minimum educational requirement generally applicable in the teaching profession. 94 Therefore,
the liberal rules applicable to teachers who have already met minimum educational requirements were not applicable to her.95
In reaching this result, the plurality interpreted §1.162-5(b)(2) to mean
"education which meets the minimum requirement of the taxpayer's employer
or education which meets the minimum requirement of another trade or
business."9 16 This interpretation blurs the distinction between the two nondeductible categories. The "minimum requirements" category of §1.162-5(b)(2)
should be limited to whether minimum qualifications for the taxpayer's present
employment have been met, whereas the function of Regulation §1.162-5(b)(3)
is to determine whether the taxpayer has qualified in a new trade or business.
The focus of the court's attention in Toner should not have been on whether
the taxpayer had met the minimum requirements of another trade or business,
but rather under the new trade or business category, whether she had qualified
for a profession which involved significantly different tasks and duties from
those being performed in her present employment. Under this analysis the
deduction might have been allowed.
The seven dissenting judges viewed the taxpayer as already in the teaching
profession. As a consequence, she qualified within the provision of the Regulations which finds all teaching and related duties to involve the same trade
or business, and so Regulation §1.162-5(b)(3) was inapplicable. Since she had
93. Id. at 780.
94. It is clear under Regulation §I.162-5(b)(2)(i) that in determining whether one has
met minimum requirements for qualification in his job, a court may examine factors such
as applicable law and standards of the profession as well as the employer's requirements.
Here there were no further requirements imposed by state law for her teaching position in
the Catholic school. Additional requirements were only imposed by state law for public
school teachers.
95. 71 T.C. at 780. In contrast, the Tax Court in Roger Laurano, 69 T.C. 723 (1978),
acquiesced in, 1978-2 C.B. 2, held that a certified teacher from Toronto, Canada, could
deduct the cost of a course required for certification in New Jersey. The court viewed the
taxpayer as already in the teaching profession and therefore entitled to the benefit of the
rule that a change in teaching duties did not constitute a new trade or business. The
court also held that the taxpayer had met the minimum requirements to be a teacher by
acquiring certification to teach in Toronto. It treated the additional New Jersey requirements as the equivalent of a change in minimum requirements after one has met minimum
requirements citing Regulation §1.162-5(b)(i). The majority in Toner distinguished Laurano
on the basis that there "the taxpayer was already a fully certified teacher, and she was
seeking to deduct the expenses of some additional education." 71 T.C. at 779. They
contrasted that to the basic college education needed by Ms. Toner "to engage generally in
the teaching profession." Id. at 779.
96. 71 T.C. at 777. (emphasis added). Three judges did not agree with this broad
interpretation of Reg. §I.162-5(b)(2) but concurred in the decision based on Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3),
disqualifying the educational expenses as being part of a program qualifying the taxpayer
for a new trade or business. Id. at 782.
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met the minimum educational requirements for the position she held before
obtaining the education in question, they felt the deduction should not be
denied on this basis either.97
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES

The educational expense deduction continues to generate an inordinate
amount of litigation. The focus of much of this litigation is the nondeductible
category of educational expenses which qualify an individual for a new trade
or business. In many cases this category is presented in tandem with the
"minimum requirements" category as a basis for denying the deductionY8
This category has also served as an alternative argument to the government's
assertion that the education was not directly and proximately related to the taxpayer's existing trade or business. 99
There are numerous aspects of the new trade or business category that have
caused it to become a focal point of the litigation in this area. First, since 1967
it has been utilized as a basis to deny educational expense deductions even
though the education was undertaken for the purpose of, and did in fact,
maintain and improve existing skills, with no intent to enter a new trade or
business. Second, what constitutes a new trade or business is a factual determination as to whether the education will enable the taxpayer to perform
significantly different tasks and activities than he could perform prior to the
education. Third, the Service and the courts applying this test have quite
readily found that the taxpayer's education did qualify him for a new trade
or business.'0 0 Finally, taxpayers who are already employed and then undertake education in a business setting and for a business reason have higher expectations that the education should be deductible than those who undertake
education with strong personal or recreational aspects or as full-time students
in preparation for a first permanent position.
The result is a complex set of tests which often provide the taxpayer with
little guidance as to whether he may properly take a deduction for the educational expenses he has incurred. Even if he can point to an employer requirement that he undertake the education, or believes the education was directly
and proximately related to skills needed in his current job, he must still show
that he has not qualified for a new trade or business. Where the taxpayer
qualifies for a profession such as physician, lawyer, or architect, he should be
aware that he has qualified for a new trade or business. But trade or business
is defined by the courts in terms of acquisition of new skills and abilities that
97. Id. at 785. On June 16, 1980, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax
Court decision in Toner essentially on the grounds set forth in the dissenting opinion. The
Third Circuit opinion severely criticizes the portion of the Tax Court decision which
destroys the analytical distinction between Regulations §1.162-5(b)(2) and §1.162-5(b)(3).
Toner v. Commissioner, F.2d -- , 1980-2 U.S.T.C. 9507 (3d Cir. 1980).

98. See, e.g., Leonarda C. Diaz, 70 T.C. 1067 (1978), afj'd without separate opinion, 607
F.2d 995, 1979-2 U.S.T.C. 9473 (2d Cir. 1979).
99. See, e.g., James A. Carroll, 51 T.C. 213 (1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 91, 1969-2 U.S.T.C.
9671 (7th Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
100. See, e.g., cases cited at note 69 supra.
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will enable him to perform significantly different tasks. Whether this entitles
him to a new job title, promotion or increased compensation is not necessarily
the deciding factor. There are any number of situations where courses in management, accounting, business, or computer technology might be considered
part of a program which would qualify the taxpayer for significantly different
tasks than he performs in his present employment.
While the current Regulations look at the results of the education rather
than the purpose for which it was undertaken, these results are evaluated in
terms of what is now possible for the taxpayer rather than what changes in
employment have taken place or are likely to take place. To safeguard against
possible changes in employment after examination of the claimed deduction,
the Regulations and the courts ignore facts indicating that it is unlikely the
taxpayer will ever enter this new trade or business. 01
The result-oriented approach used by the Regulations has caused considerable difficulty for taxpayers. One indication of taxpayers' inability to
understand or accept the current rules is that several years after the promulgation of the 1967 Regulations, litigation continues over the deductibility of the
expenses of attending law school. This has occurred despite the Regulations'
clear statement that this specific type of education is nondeductible, 0 2 and the
courts' uniform agreement. 0 In many of these cases the taxpayers, after obtaining their law degrees, returned to their former nonlegal jobs. It appears
particularly difficult for this group of relatively well-educated taxpayers to
accept that the reasons they undertook the education and the use they have
04
made of it are not relevant.
The continued high volume of litigation is, in part, a natural consequence
of the factual nature of the issues to be resolved under the tests established by
the Regulations and the courts. Of course, reducing litigation is not an absolute goal. There may well be situations where judicial determinations based
on flexible tests produce more equitable results than highly structured statutory
or regulatory provisions. It is hard to make that argument, however, for many
of the cases involving the deductibility of educational expenses. 0 5
The current Regulations, presumably in an effort to reduce litigation, have
dealt rather specifically with education in two fields. The Regulations virtually
eliminate a deduction for law school expenses. Thus, a lawyer who undertakes
education to qualify to practice in a second state is not allowed a deduction,
101. See Yvan Roussel, 38 T.C.M. 565, 567 (CCH 1979) (unlikely taxpayer would give
up salary and benefits to enter new trade or business he had qualified for).
102. See Reg. §1.162-5(3), ex. 2 (1967).
103. See cases cited at notes 76 & 79 supra.
104. Juanita F. Ardavany, 38 T.C.M. 569, 572 (CCH 1979) ("Petitioner asserts that
since she did not take the law degree with any intent to practice law, she is not subject to
the limitations enumerated in §1.162-5(b)(8), Income Tax Regs."); Kenneth G. Bouchard,
36 T.C.M. 1098, 1100 (CCH 1977) (petitioner requested application of a subjective test
based on his intent to utilize his law education outside the practice of law); George H. Dinsmore, 36 T.C.M. 1008, 1009 (CCH 1977) (taxpayer argument that his primary purpose was
not to become a lawyer rejected).
105. At the audit level the highly factual nature of the questions presented creates the
potential for uneven and inequitable administration.
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as he has qualified in a new trade or business.0 8 On the other hand, the
Regulations are very liberal regarding teachers, and the courts have allowed
educational deductions for them, which might not have qualified under the
tests applied to other taxpayers. A teacher who undertakes education to qualify
to teach in a second state may deduct the cost of that education. 10 7 It does not
seem to be an adequate explanation of the difference in treatment to say
that the Regulations deal directly with teachers and provide liberal rules for
them. 08 Taxpayers perceive this as favoritism toward the teaching profession. 09
Courts may feel constrained by the origins of the deduction. It did not
originate from a policy decision to encourage education but as an appropriate
business expense deduction in arriving at a fair determination of the taxpayer's
net income. On that basis alone, however, the deduction still seems too
narrowly drawn and interpreted where the expense is incurred in a business
context.
Alternatives to the current rule of uniform nondeductibility of all educational expenditures which qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business
should be considered. A return to an investigation of the taxpayer's subjective
purpose in undertaking the education would not be an advisable alternative.
Application of this approach under the 1958 Regulations showed that it was
administratively unworkable and resulted in a constant stream of litigation. A
preferable alternative would be to eliminate qualification for a new trade or
business as a basis for denying deductions for education, while leaving the
rest of the law in this area intact. Educational expenses would then be deductible by a person already in a trade or business if the education was directly
and proximately related to the taxpayer's existing trade or business or was
required by his employer. Expenses for education neither related to the taxpayer's existing trade or business nor required by his employer would remain nondeductible because they involved recreation or preparation for entry into an
unrelated business. The minimum requirements category would continue to
deny deductions for education undertaken to qualify for initial employment. 10
Moreover, such a change would allow deductibility of law school expenses
106. See cases cited as note 67 supra.
107. Roger Laurano, 69 T.C. 723 (1978).
108. But see, e.g., id. at 728-29.
109. See cases cited at note 82 supra.
110. If the minimum requirements category is interpreted to prohibit a deduction for
education necessary to meet the minimum requirements of a taxpayer's current employment
or any other trade or business, this category would encompass qualification for a new
trade or business, and elimination of the latter category would be of no effect. Five members
of the Tax Court recently interpreted the minimum requirements category in this manner.
See Linda M. Liberi Toner, 71 T.C. 772 (1979), rev'd, F.2d -,
1980-2 U.S.T.C. %9507
(3d Cir. 1980). See generally U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT,
CHANGES NEEDED IN THE TAX

LAWS

GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION FOR SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOW-

EXPENSES (Oct. 31, 1978) (advocating
elimination of the trade or business category of nondeductible educational expenses). Apparently the proposal is limited to situations where the expense is incurred "in connection
with" the taxpayer's current employment, although this is not entirely clear. See id. at 72.
A broader approach would be to allow a deduction for any business type educational
SHIPS AND THE DEDUCTION OF JOB RELATED EDUCATIONAL

expense even though it has no connection with the taxpayer's current trade or business.
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upon a sufficient showing of the necessary relationship between legal skills
and the taxpayer's existing employment, even though the education qualified
taxpayer for a new profession. Of course, much would depend on the future
administrative and judicial construction of the direct and proximate relationship test. A very narrow view of the skills needed in the taxpayer's trade or
business would leave the taxpayer in the same place as if the deduction were
denied on new trade or business grounds. It might be necessary to establish a
test which only requires that the education be reasonably connected with the
taxpayer's existing trade or business, at least where the expense is clearly of a
business nature. Such a restructuring would end the controversy under existing
law arising from the new trade or business limitation on legitimate business
expenses which have a relationship to taxpayer's existing employment. It
would preserve the distinction between education which is primarily personal
or recreational and that which is primarily related to income production. This
approach would still require factual determinations of the relationship between the education and the job but the additional inquiries into whether the
education qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business would be eliminated. This would produce fairer, more predictable results in many cases.
Additionally, the analysis would be accomplished without the problems inherent in the subjective inquiry into the taxpayer's motives.
One objection to the elimination of the new trade or business category
of nondeductible educational expenses is that it would create unequal treatment between those who obtain education before entering the job market and
those who obtain education after entering some trade or business. Of course,
problems of horizontal equity exist to some extent under current law as all
deductible education must relate to an existing trade or business in which the
taxpayer is currently engaged. Without the new trade or business limitation
this disparity would be increased. However, this proposal would allow the
deduction in cases where it is not now available only if the taxpayer could
show a relationship to his existing trade or business. Training to enter a new
profession unrelated to the taxpayer's existing employment would remain
nondeductible. To this extent, parity of treatment would exist between those
currently employed and those whose training for minimum requirements precedes permanent employment. The more important this parity is thought to
be, the more tightly drawn the standard of relationship between the education
and the existing employment should be.
A further objection to the current deductibility of educational expenses
which relate to employment but also qualify the taxpayer for a new trade
or business, is that in many situations this would allow a current deduction
for what is really a capital expenditure. The alternative solution of amortizing
educational expenditures which are in the nature of capital expenditures
is discussed fully in the next section of this article. To date the Treasury and
the courts have refused to allow amortization of any educational expenditures
denied a current deduction under either of the nondeductible categories in
the Regulations. Thus, while a ratable recovery of the cost of substantial
educational expenditures might be a more proper approach, it is not an alternative currently available to taxpayers. Therefore, this argument against
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current deductibility must be evaluated with these holdings in mind. Moreover,
this objection is perhaps more properly raised against current deductibility of
education which is unrelated to taxpayer's current trade or business, or which
is necessary to qualify him for his current trade or business. The next section
of this article will discuss the possibility of amortizing these types of educational expenditures.
AmORTIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL ExPENSES

Internal Revenue Code section 167 permits a taxpayer to recover the cost
of property used in his trade or business or held for the production of income,
through depreciation or amortization deductions spread over the useful life
of the asset. An intangible asset may be the subject of such an allowance if it
"is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the business . . .
for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy." 11'
In a business context, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether an
outlay constitutes an ordinary and necessary trade or business expense deductible currently under section 162, or a capital expenditure nondeductible
in the year of payment pursuant to section 263 of the Code, but deductible
ratably over the life of the asset in accordance with section 167. Generally, an
expenditure will not be treated as an ordinary and necessary business expense
if it results in the acquisition of an asset having a useful life in excess of one
year, or if it secures a benefit to the taxpayer lasting beyond the taxable
year.1 12 If an outlay is of a personal nature, the taxpayer will be entitled to
neither a current deduction nor a ratable recovery of the expenditure through
1
depreciation or amortization deductions. 3
Historically, in the area of educational expenses, the Commissioner and
the courts have too often failed to differentiate between educational costs
which are denied a current deduction because of the personal nature of the
outlay and those denied a current deduction because, while having a business
nexus, they constitute capital expenditures.11 4 Many of the early cases, as
well as the 1958 Regulations, characterized all nondeductible educational
expenses as "personal."115 Such a characterization, of course, also precludes
recovery through amortization. Thus in Nathaniel A. Denman,"6 a taxpayer
sought to amortize the cost of obtaining his engineering degree. The court
stated that the cost of such education is a personal expense and is therefore
neither currently deductible nor amortizable.' 1 7 The 1967 Regulations at
111. Reg. §1.167(a)(3).
112. Akin v. United States, 248 F.2d 742, 1957-2 U.S.T.C. 1J9999 (10th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958).
113. I.R.C. §262 (deduction disallowed for "personal, living or family expenses').
114. See, e.g., Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956, 958 (1950); Wolfman, Professors and the
"Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1089, 1093, 1098, 1112 (1964).
115. Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3, 4 (1951). See also Reg. §1.162-5(b) (1958) (now Reg.
§1.162-5(a)-(c)).
116. 48 T.C. 439 (1967).
117. Id. at 446. Accord, David N. Bodley, 56 T.C. 1357, 1362 (1971) (taxpayer attempt
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least recognize that some nondeductible educational expenses are capital or
at least largely so, but characterize them as an "inseparable aggregate of
personal and capital expenditures.""" As long as the courts and the Service
fail to distinguish between personal and capital, or simply characterize all
non-currently deductible educational expenses as "personal," the alternative
of amortization will not be adequately considered.
The most recent and most extensive judicial discussion of the amortization
of educational expenses to date is contained in the Tax Court decision in
Joel A. Sharon.1 9 The taxpayer in Sharon argued that he was entitled, under
section 167, to amortize the cost of obtaining his license to practice law in
New York State.120 In a reviewed decision of the Tax Court the majority
opinion began by stating that despite characterizing the cost of college, law
school, and a bar review course as licensing costs, they constitute costs of education and, as such, are deductible only if they qualify under section 162 and
Regulation §1.162-5.21 Applying the Regulations, the Tax Court determined
that these costs incurred to meet the minimum educational requirements for
qualification in taxpayer's trade or business constituted an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures and would not be deductible. Noting
that such expenses were not made any less personal or any more separable
from the aggregate by the taxpayer's attempting to capitalize them for amortization purposes, the court held that "[s]ince the inseparable aggregate includes
personal expenditures, the preeminence of section 262 over section 167 pre22
cludes any amortization deduction."'
In contrast, the twenty-five dollar bar examination fee paid to New York
State, as well as the noneducational costs of acquiring a license to practice in a
second state, California, were held to be amortizable over the taxpayer's lifetime. In this regard the court observed that "[t]he Commissioner does not
argue that the capital expenditures incurred in obtaining his license to practice
law in California may not be amortized. In a series of cases, the courts have
held that the fees paid by physicians to acquire hospital privileges are not
current business expenses, but are capital expenditures amortizable over the
2
doctor's life expectancy."'
to amortize law school expenses over five-year period rejected because there was no legal
or factual basis for amortization, citing Denman).
118.

Reg. §1.162-5(b)(1).

119. 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273, 1978-2 U.S.T.C. 9834 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2883 (1979).
120. Id. at 525. The taxpayer argued that the proper amortization period was the
period from the date of his admission to the bar to the date he expected to retire at the
age of 65. Since he was required to have graduated from college and an accredited law
school in order to take the New York bar examination, he reasoned that these costs, as well
as the cost of a bar review course, should be added to the $25 bar examination fee and
treated as part of the cost of obtaining his license. The taxpayer attempted to have these
educational costs characterized as licensing costs to avoid the Tax Court's prior holding in
Denman which denied amortization for educational expenses. Id. at 526.
121.

Id.

122. Id.
123. In Rev. Rul. 70-171, 1970-1 C.B. 55, the Service held that a fee paid by a physician
to a hospital in exchange for a nontransferable lifetime privilege to use the hospital's facili-
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Two of the Tax Court judges in the Sharon case would not have allowed
amortization of the license fees based on their belief that the useful life of
the fees, and therefore the proper period of amortization, was indefinite or
indeterminable. The majority approach, and apparently that of the Service,
is to allow amortization of these fees but to require the taxpayer to amortize
these costs over the longest period which can be determined with reasonable
accuracy, namely his life expectancy, unless he can establish a shorter period.124
In light of these developments with respect to lifetime membership fees, the
argument against the amortization of educational capital expenditures cannot
rest on the inability to determine an accurate useful life for that intangible
asset. The useful life of a license to practice law and the useful life of the
education necessary to engage in that practice are sufficiently similar so that
the above approach to determine the proper amortization period could be
used if a court or the Service were otherwise disposed to allow amortization of
such expenditures.

25

The difference in the treatment of the two types of expenditures then
derives from the fact that the professional license fees, while capital in nature,
were purely business, whereas the educational expenditures which prepare
the taxpayer to become a lawyer had personal and business aspects. In the Tax
Court's view, there was no "workable basis for any allocation of this inseparable aggregate between the nondeductible personal component and a
126
deductible component of the total expense."'
The portion of the Sharon opinion which deals with the taxpayer's expenditures to qualify to practice in a second state presented the Tax Court
with a particularly good opportunity to reevaluate its position on amortization,
at least with respect to some educational expenditures. The court, however,
did not avail itself of this opportunity. The court allowed amortization of the
ties is a capital expenditure recoverable by amortization deductions based on the physician's
life expectancy at the date of acquisition. The ruling notes that where it can be established
that circumstances merit a shorter useful life, such shorter life should be utilized in computing
the amortization deductions. Thus while disallowing the fee as a current expense, the Service
does allow it as an amortizable capital expenditure. This ruling was in response to a
number of court decisions to the same effect which were relied on by the court in Sharon:
Walters v. Commissioner, 383 F.2d 922, 924, 1967-2 U.S.T.C. 9677 (6th Cir. 1967); Glenn
L. Heigerick, 45 T.C. 475, 478-79 (1966); S. M. Howard, 39 T.C. 833, 838-39 (1963).
124. In Arthur E. Ryman, Jr., 51 T.C. 799 (1969), a law professor sought to deduct as an
ordinary business expense the cost of bar admission in the state in which he resided. Since
the taxpayer could reasonably expect the useful life of his license to extend beyond one
year, the court held that, "clearly, this expenditure was capital in nature and not deductible
as a business expense in the year of payment." Id. at 803. There was no discussion in the
case of the possibility of amortizing this expenditure. Accord, Larry R. Adamson, 32 T.C.M.
484 (CCH 1973) (no current deduction because benefits from admission to the bar are of
"infinite duration" and in the nature of capital expenditures).
125. The Tax Court has continued to apply this approach to business related lifetime
membership fees. In Wade H. Snell, Jr., 38 T.C.M. 635 (CCH 1979), the taxpayer sought to
amortize the cost of a nonassignable lifetime membership in Lloyd's of London. Rejecting
the Service's argument that amortization should not be allowed because the useful life of
the asset was indefinite, the Tax Court held, under the reasoning in Sharon, that the taxpayer could amortize the cost over his life expectancy. Id. at 637.
126. 66 T.C. at 526.
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fees incurred in taking the second state bar examination. It denied the taxpayer the right to amortize the bar review course he took in preparation for
that exam, even though this second bar review course was not taken immediately after college and law school as part of his preparation for the legal
profession. The court reasoned that the bar review course was education
which "helped to qualify the petitioner for a new trade or business so that its
costs are personal expenses."' 27 If qualifying to practice in a new state was
qualifying in a new trade or business, the bar review course should be treated
as a cost of commencing a new trade or business, a capital expenditure. Of
course, a "personal" capital expenditure is not amortizable or depreciable.
However, it is difficult to see any personal element in a bar review course.
Nor can the court be saying that all expenditures preparatory to entering a
trade or business are personal, since the court treated the license fees as
business capital expenditures. The bar review course was as much a business
connected capital expenditure as were the bar examination and admittance
fees and the court admittance fees, which the Tax Court allowed to be
amortized. The cost of the bar review course should have been amortizable,
along with the other costs of obtaining the license to practice law in California.
It is difficult to see why difference in treatment should turn on the fact that
the course was an educational expenditure. 12
Review courses for professional examinations present perhaps the clearest
example of the type of educational expenses for which amortization should be
allowed. While most other educational expenditures of the type now denied
deduction contain some personal component, a flat rule of disallowance seems
unnecessarily harsh. An allocation between the personal and business aspects
of specific educational undertakings would probably not be feasible. It does
seem to be judicially and administratively "workable," however, to simply
ignore the small personal element in some types of education.
Under current law, professional and graduate education is denied a current
deduction in most circumstances. Perhaps this is proper, given the substantial
dollar investment by the taxpayer, and that the professional education has a
useful life which extends well beyond the years in which the costs are incurred. At that level of education, however, the personal aspect of fulfilling
one's educational and cultural aspirations is far enough outweighed by the
direct business content of these expenditures that amortization should be
allowed. Moreover, the way the law has developed, professional persons
currently in a trade or business who return to school for specialty training in
their field, or a graduate degree that does not qualify them for a new business,
may take a current deduction for the cost of such training. This is true even
though the amount is substantial and the useful life of this intangible asset
extends far beyond the year in which the cost is incurred.
127. Id. at 528. Only one judge thought qualifying to practice law in a second state
did not constitute a new trade or business. Id. at 536 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
128. The use of different standards and tests to determine deductibility of various types
of expenses under I.R.C. §162 is a pervasive problem. See Halperin. Business Deduction for
PersonalLiving Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. Rarv.

859 (1974).
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Amortization of all professional and graduate educational expenditures
would seem to avoid both the distortion of income occurring in those cases
where a current deduction is now allowed and the basic unfairness of disallowing any tax recovery for a predominately business capital expenditure which
may be expected to produce significant amounts of taxable income over the
taxpayer's life. The goal of seeking an accurate determination of the taxpayer's
net income does not seem to be well served by the current state of the law.
Even below the professional or graduate school level, an argument can be
made for amortization of certain technical and vocational training programs,
1 29
particularly since the persons affected are probably in a lower income group.
Such a shift of position would appear to be within the power of the courts
based simply on the current status of the law, with only a slight adjustment.
That is, a court could determine that the particular education in question
was so predominately business related that the personal component should be
ignored. This business related capital expenditure would then be entitled to
amortization over the taxpayer's life expectancy or any shorter useful life the
taxpayer can establish.
Congress might wish to intervene to limit the amortization deductions offsetting only earned income rather than passive income or, even more narrowly,
allowing an offset only against income generated from the business or profession to which the educational expense related. 30 On the other hand, Congress
might determine that it would be more practical administratively from the
standpoint of both the taxpayer and the Service to legislate a shorter period
of amortization than the actual useful life of the education and to allow an
immediate write-off for minor expenditures.
Should a taxpayer be able to amortize a general college education? This
type of education usually involves a stronger personal component than do
graduate and professional education. Therefore, tax recognition of this cost
cannot be as easily justified solely on grounds of a fair determination of a
taxpayer's net income. Because of the larger social and policy implications,
as well as the greater revenue loss involved, the question is more properly a
legislative matter.13 It belongs to the current debate on tuition credit legislation, 32 along with private high school and elementary school educational costs.
The narrowness of the educational expenses deduction set forth in the
Regulations and interpreted by the courts is in large part responsible for
129. For the view that amortization should probably be limited to postgraduate work
and post high school vocational training, see Halperin, supra note 128, at 905. Also see
Wolfman, supra note 114, at 1112.
130. One might question, however, why these kinds of special restrictions should be placed
on amortization of educational expenses when they are not usually placed on other
amortizable or depreciable assets. See R. GooDE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOMiE TAX 84 (1964).
131. For the view that the cost of a college education should be amortizable, see
GooDE, supra note 130, at 84; McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal
Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1, 28-29
(1973).
132. For a discussion of the 1978 tuition tax credit legislation, see Surrey & McDaniel,
The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV.
225, 327 (1979).
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the enactment of Code section 127 in 1978. That section, to be discussed in
detail later in this article, allows an employee to exclude from income most
education expenses paid for by an employer as part of a program which
qualifies under the section. Problems of horizontal equity are increased by
this section, however, since it only covers the educational costs of certain
taxpayers. Amortization might have been a compromise solution to the issue
for all taxpayers. One consequence of the enactment of section 127 is that
even if taxpayers not covered by that section were now allowed to amortize
their educational expenditure they would still not achieve parity with those
covered by a section 127 plan.
SCHOLARSHIPS AND INFORMAL EXCLUSION

Internal Revenue Code Section 117(a) provides that the gross income of an
individual does not include any amount received as a scholarship at an educational institution or as a fellowship grant. s3 The Regulations define a scholarship or fellowship grant as an amount paid to or for the benefit of an individual
to aid in the pursuit of studies or research. 34 Section 117(b) provides exceptions
and limitations to the broad exclusionary rule of section 117(a). Section

117(b) (1) states that a degree candidate cannot exclude any amount to the
extent it represents compensation for teaching, research, or other part-time
services, which is required as a condition to receiving the scholarship or fellowship grant, unless such services are required of all candidates for a particular
degree as a condition to receiving the degree. Section 117(b) provides that
in the case of a non-degree candidate, the grantor of the scholarship or fellowship must be either an exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3), a
foreign government, a qualified international organization, the United States
or an instrumentality or agency thereof. In addition, the maximum exclusion
from income available to a non-degree candidate is 300.00 per month for not
more than 36 months.'-"
Regulation §1.117-4(c) provides that amounts representing "compensation
for past, present, or future employment services" and amounts paid to "an
individual to enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit
of the grantor" are not excludable as scholarships or fellowship grants. In
Bingier v. Johnson,'-" the Supreme Court upheld Regulation §1.117-4(c) and
its exclusion of amounts representing compensation for services from the
definition of a scholarship or fellowship grant. The Court stated that scholarships and fellowships are "relatively disinterested, 'no strings' educational
grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid pro quo from the

133. The exclusion also covers the value of contributed services and accommodations,
such as room and board. I.R.C. §117(a)(1), Reg. §1.117-3(d). In addition, any amount received
to cover expenses for travel, research, clerical help, or equipment which are incidental to
such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant are excluded from income to the extent that the
amount is expended by the individual. I.R.C. §117(a)(2).
184. Reg. §1.117-8(a), (c).
135. Id.
136. 894 U.S. 741 (1969).
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recipients."' 37 The case involved the tax treatment of payments received by
employees of Westinghouse Electric Corporation while they were on educational leave from their jobs in pursuit of doctorate degrees in engineering.
The Court concluded that the grants were fully bargained for and in the
nature of compensation. The program was featured in Westinghouse's recruiting efforts as a benefit attractive to many potential employees. The Court
also noted that the employer-employee relationship involved immediately
suggested compensation. Finally, the Court stated that, "most importantly,
Westinghouse unquestionably extracted a quid pro quo for its grants,"' 38 in
that the recipients were obligated to return to Westinghouse's employ for a
substantial period of time after completion of their leave.1 39
The effect of this regulation, as interpreted and approved by the Supreme
Court in Bingler v. Johnson, is to require a threshold determination of whether
the primary purpose of the payment was to further the taxpayer's education
and training or to compensate him for past, present or future services.140 This
is a question of fact141 and has led to a considerable amount of litigation,
especially involving medical interns or residents. In almost all cases, the courts
have found the stipends to be compensation. 142 Some courts have noted that
many workmen learn from experience how to do their jobs more effectively, yet
payments they receive are considered compensatory and not excludable educational grants despite the beneficial training and experience.'4 3 Among the
factors found to be significant in reaching the decision that the payments are
taxable are: (1) the hospital received substantial services from the intern;
(2) the taxpayer replaced other hospital personnel; (3) the intern or resident
was considered an employee by the hospital and that payments were treated
as salary; (4) payroll deductions were made from these payments; (5) the tax137. Id. at 751.
138. Id. at 757.
139. Employer-sponsored plans similar to that in Bingler have been held not to qualify
as scholarships where there was a clear expectation, though no contractual obligation, that
the employee would return. See, e.g., John E. MacDonald, 52 T.C. 386 (1969).
140. This determination must be made for both degree and nondegree candidates.
Morgan M. McCoy, II, 34 T.C.M. 1435, 1436 (CCH 1975). Except in cases under §117(b)(1),
the courts have not allowed an apportionment, treating part of the payment as taxable
compensation and part as an excludable scholarship or fellowship. Quast v. United States,
428 F.2d 750, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. %9478 (8th Cir. 1970).
141. Shuff v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 807, 810, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9624 (W.D. Va. 1971).
142. E.g., Steven M. Weinberg, 64 T.C. 771 (1975); Robert D. Bretz, 37 T.C.M. 278
(CCH 1978); Richard Bogdan, 37 T.C.M. 1127 (CCH 1978); William E. Boden, 36 T.C.M.
1386 (CCH 1977); Vance L. Alexander, 36 T.C.M. 673 (CCH 1977). In Parr v. United States,
469 F.2d 1156, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19101 (5th Cir. 1972), after holding payments to two residents
were not excludable, the court stated: "We do not attempt to dictate a per se rule holding
that all advanced medical personnel are employees and that all payments to them are subject
to taxation. However, we sympathize with the District Court's lamentation that these facts,
or facts nearly identical, have been litigated so often that one may wonder whether this is
wise or what good it can do .... Which is to say, this is not the last word, only the latest."
Id. at 1159. In Morgan M. McCoy, II, 34 T.C.M. 1435 (CCH 1975), the taxpayer was referred
to as "another of the throng of medical interns and residents who have claimed this
exclusion." Exclusion was denied. Id. at 1436.
143. James J. Ferrero, 35 T.C.M. 388, 390 (CCH 1976).
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payer promised and was obliged to remain in the hospital's employ after
residency.-" On occasion, such taxpayers have been successful in having these
payments excluded as scholarships or fellowships, particularly where services
rendered by them were not substantial and were of only incidental benefit to
145
the hospital.
The other major area of litigation under this section involves stipends
paid by educational institutions to graduate students, usually degree candidates, where teaching or research must be performed in connection with theeducational program. 4 6 Pursuant to section 117(b)(1) the entire amount has
been held excludable where teaching dudes were required of all degree candidates. :4 7 Where teaching or research was required only from those receiving
stipends, or the services required were in excess of those required of other
degree candidates, the stipend, or at least a portion of it, has been held to
constitute compensation income rather than an excludable scholarship. Courts
have reached this result in cases where the part-time teaching is not required
of all candidates for a degree thus falling under the exception to section 117(a)
found in section 117(b)(1). 48 Perhaps more often a determination has been
made that the stipend represented compensation under section 61 and not a
scholarship subject to section 117 by application of the primary purpose test
of Regulation §1.117-4(c). 149 Under this latter analysis, stipends labeled scholarships, but found to be primarily compensatory, are includable in income as
wholly outside the scholarship section. This is true even if the exception to the
inclusion rule of section 117(b)(1) for teaching or research required of all
degree candidates is met.L 0
In general, if an employer pays or reimburses an employee for educational
expenses with a requirement that the courses be related to the employee's job,
the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that the payments are
not scholarships. The reasoning is that the job-related courses taken by the
144. Shuff v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 807, 813, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9624 (W.D. Va. 1971).
145. Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9139 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973) (upholding jury verdict that payments to residents in a teaching
hospital were excludable); Frederick A. Bieberdorf, 60 T.C. 114 (1973), acquiesced in, 1973-2
C.B. 1 (no requirement taxpayer perform services or research for grantor other than an
incidental to furtherance of individual's education and training); Pappas v. United States,
1967-1 U.S.T.C. 9386 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (jury found payment to medical residents was to
advance education and not as compensation); Shuff v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 807, 1971-2
U.S.T.C. 9624 (W.D. Va. 1971).
146. In many of these cases the Service has only challenged the cash stipend, raising no
issue as to the excludability under §117 of the accompanying tuition remission. Edward C.
De Fabo, 84 T.C.M. 1227 (CCH 1975); Robert N. Worthington, 31 T.C.M. 447 (CCH 1972);
Elmer L. Reese, Jr., 45 T.C. 407 (1966), aff'd, 878 F.2d 742, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 9307 (4th Cir.

1967).
147. Robert Henry Steiman, 56 T.C. 1850 (1971); Chander P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 18 (1960);
Rev. Rul. 75-280, 1975-2 C.B. 47.
148. E.g., Pelz v. United States, 551 F.2d 291, 1977-1 U.S.T.C. 9297 (Ct. Cl. 1977).

149. Robert N. Worthington, 81 T.C.M. 447 (CCH 1972); Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C.
849 (1968).
150. Donald R. DiBona, 27 T.C.M. 1055, 1060 (CCH 1968); Elmer L. Reese, Jr., 45 T.C.
407 (1966) (teaching required of all candidates for teaching degree at university), aff'd,
373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
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employees make them more effective employees. Therefore, these amounts
are paid primarily for the benefit of the employer-grantor, and under Regulation §1.117-4(c), are not scholarships.'S1 However, if the expenses would have
been deductible under Regulation §1.162-5, had the employee paid them himself, the payments are to be treated as noncompensatory business expenses of
the employer and not includable in the employee's gross income. 15 2
If the employer pays for an employee's courses under a plan that does not
require the courses to be related to the employee's job, then the government's
position is that the payments are compensatory in nature and therefore not
scholarships under that portion of Regulation §1.117-4(c) .53 Since the payments are compensatory and not primarily for the benefit of the grantor, they
must be included in the employee's income as additional compensation. Employees may still deduct these costs as educational expenses under Regulation
§1.162-5 if they meet its requirements' 5 4
The characterization of certain job-related educational expenses as noncompensatory business expenses of the employer and not employee income
presents some conceptual difficulty. The reasoning appears to be that if the
educational expenses are deductible because they are required by the employer
or maintain the employee's skills, but do not qualify the taxpayer for a new
trade or business, then the payment is primarily for the employer's benefit
and not compensatory to the employee. For example, Revenue Ruling 76-61
allows an exclusion for job-related law courses taken by correspondence which
do not entitle the employee to sit for any state bar exam. On the other hand,
reimbursement for job-related law courses taken by another employee at a law
school which is part of a program qualifying him to sit for a bar examination
are not excluded since they would not be deductible. The benefit to the employer, which is the basis of the exclusion from income, is the same in either
case.i55
The Service also maintains that educational payments or reimbursements
which are considered to be noncompensatory business expenses of the employer,

151. Rev. Rul. 76-62, 1976-1 C.B. 12; Rev. Rul. 76-71, 1976-1 C.B. 308.
152. Id. The exclusions allowed in these rulings involved tuition costs, books, and
materials. Where the employee's educational expenses are incurred primarily for the benefit
of the employer, and the employee is reimbursed for tuition expense, Reg. §1.162-17(b)(1)
provides that the employee need only state on his return that the amounts received as reimbursement did not exceed the ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred
by the employee. If tuition is paid directly to the educational institution, the amounts are
not income to the employees and need not be reported at all. Rev. Rul. 76-71, 1976-1 C.B. 308,
309-10. Although tuition fees paid by an employer directly to a university on behalf of an
employee have been treated as noncompensatory, monthly payments to an employee while
on educational leave under a Bingler v. Johnson type arrangement were considered gross
income under I.R.C. §61 as compensation for services. Further, the employee's educational
expenses were not excludable under I.R.C. §l17(a). Rev. Rul. 76-65, 1976-1 C.B. 46.
153. Rev. Rul. 76-352, 1976-2 C.B. 37.
154. Id. at 38.
155. Rev. Rul. 76-62, 1976-1 C.B. 12, 13. The ruling characterizes such nondeductible
expenses as "personal." Id. However, they seem to be more in the nature of business related
capital expenditures.
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are not "wages" subject to the employment taxes and withholding.156 However, where the employer's payments or reimbursements are considered compensatory, they will be treated as "wages" for purposes of the employment
taxes and withholding.'5 7 The burden thus placed on employers to withhold
taxes on certain educational payments or reimbursements, as well as to determine in which situations this need be done, caused many employers to urge
enactment of a provision such as section 127.
EDUCATIONAL ASssTANCE PROGRAMS INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 127

Scope of the Section
Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code, added by section 164 of the
Revenue Act of 1978,158 excludes from an employee's gross income employerprovided educational assistance under a plan meeting the specific requirements
of the section. Section 127(c)(1) defines "educational assistance" as including
but not limited to tuition, fees and similar payments, books, supplies and
equipment. It does not include meals, lodging, transportation, or tools and
supplies which may be retained by the employee after completion of the
course of instruction.m' 9 There is no dollar limitation on the amount which
may be spent under such a program, in general, or with respect to any particular employee, subject to the nondiscrimination requirements to be discussed.
Educational assistance to employees may be furnished by an educational
institution or any other party, and the employer may either pay the one
providing the education directly or reimburse the employee for the educational
expenses. s0 In addition, the employer, alone or in conjunction with other
employers, may furnish the education directly to the employees.' 6 There is no
statutory requirement that the education be in the form of structured course
work, only that the expenses must be incurred "for education of the em-

156. Rev. Rul. 76-71, 1976-1 C.B. 308, 310.
157. Rev. Rul. 76-352, 1976-2 C.B. 37, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 78-184, 1978 C.B. 804;
cf. Reg. §31.3121(a)-l(h) (reimbursements to employees for expenses incurred in employer's
business do not constitute "wages").
158. Pub. L. No. 95-600, §164, 92 Stat. 2667 (1978) (codified at I.R.C. §127). The term
"employer" for purposes of §127 includes partnerships and sole proprietorships and is not
limited to corporations. I.R.C. §127(c)(3). Both a partner and a sole proprietor may qualify as
employees. I.R.C. §127(c)(2). Participation by partners and sole proprietors is, however,
severely limited. See §127(b)(3).
159. In appropriate circumstances, a reimbursement for meals, lodging and transportation
related to education not excludable under §127 could be deductible under the educational
expense Regulations. LR.C. §127(c)(6); Reg. §1.162-5(e)(1).
160. I.R.C. §127(c)(1)(A). The Senate Report states that the education may be furnished
by "an educational institution or any other party." S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1978-3 C.B. 400 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. Therefore, payments to correspondence
schools or to an individual in the business of providing educational training should qualify.
161. I.R.C. §127(c)(1)(B); S,Rnl'., supra note 160, at 102? 1978-3 at 400.
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ployee."' 62 Informal or individualized instruction or training should also
qualify, if provided on a nondiscriminatory basis.
There is no requirement that the education be of such a nature that it
would be deductible under Regulation §1.162-5. The value of the educational
assistance provided to the employee will be excluded from his income even
though it may qualify him for a new trade or business. The troublesome
factual determination of whether the education qualifies the taxpayer to
perform tasks and activities significantly different from those he could perform
prior to the education is thus avoided. It is also irrelevant under the section
that the education enables the employee to meet the minimum educational
requirements for qualification in his employment.
Even if an educational expenditure does not fall within one of the two
nondeductible categories of Regulation §1.162-5, a deduction will be denied
if the education does not bear a direct and proximate relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business.1s This test is not applicable under section 127. The
only limitation in this section is that the term "educational assistance" does
not include expenditures for "any course or other education involving sports,
games and hobbies.."164 If the taxpayer pursuant to a section 127 plan takes
courses to improve his reading skills or to increase the effectiveness of his oral
or written communications, the test of exclusion is not how directly connected
the course is to skills needed in the employee's current position, but rather
whether the course deals with a sport, a game, or a hobby. Therefore, such
courses should qualify for the exclusion not because they arguably have some
connection with job skills, but because they quite clearly do not involve a
sport, a game, or a hobby. Moreover, courses may have no connection with a
taxpayer's employment, but still not fit within a reasonable definition of
sport, game, or hobby. Courses in management of personal finances or improvement of family communications are examples. 65 In fact, an employer-financed
general college education which is undertaken to fulfill general cultural and
educational aspirations should qualify. The employer must finance such plans
and do so on a nondiscriminatory basis. As the proponents of section 127
noted, 68 most employers would tend to restrict educational benefits to courses
dealing somewhat with current or future employment-related skills.
The only appropriate place for a business connection test under the section
is as a limitation on courses which would otherwise be disqualified. The Senate
Report states that the exception does not apply where the sport, game, or
162. See I.R.C. §127(c)(1)(A).
163. James A. Carroll, 51 T.C. 213, 218 (1968), afl'd, 418 F.2d 91, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9691
(7th Cir. 1969).
164. I.R.C. §127(c)(1)(B) (last sentence).
165. In an effort to limit the exclusion, it may be argued that such courses are not
educational. There is no indication in the section itself or in the legislative history that
this type of course does not constitute education. In a different context, the Regulations
define "educational" as "(a) The instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of
improving or developing his capabilities; or (b) The instruction of the public on subjects
useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3).
166. 124 CONG. REc. S29 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Packwood accompanying introduction of S.2388).
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hobby "involves the business of the employer."167 While the meaning of sports,
games, and hobbies for purposes of this section will have to be worked out
administratively and judicially, this should not result in infusing a business
nexus test, unintended by Congress, into the section. 68
The Senate Report, in discussing the reasons why a change in the current
state of the law was necessary, stated:
The "job-related" distinction is often both ambiguous and restrictive.
For example, if a person with little or no work experience is employed
in an entry-level position and receives training from his employer to
advance to a job requiring some greater skills or experience, the value
of the training may be taxable. This may discourage self-improvement.
If a typist, for example, receives training to be a secretary, or if a
secretary receives training in a paralegal program, it might be considered not job-related . . .
However, the higher the level of job held by an employee, the greater
the variety courses or training likely to qualify as related to the employee's job. The committee believes
that the unfairness of this anoma9
lous result should be eliminated.26
As the Senate Report indicates, a major concern was the "ambiguous and

restrictive" distinctions made under the "new trade or business" prohibition
and the "directly and proximately related" standard, particularly at the lower
levels of employment.
Moreover, as noted earlier, the Internal Revenue Service took the position
that payments or reimbursements for educational assistance which would not
qualify for a deduction constituted wages subject to withholding and employment taxes.1 70 Therefore, the employer had to initially determine whether the
education was of a type which would qualify for a deduction if the employee
had paid for it himself. Evidently there was wide variance in the ways employers complied with this requirement. Many employers simply elected a blanket
withholding for all employees; others elected to deal with possible ambiguities
on a case-by-case basis, which increased cost in terms of personnel and time to
the employer. Still other employers did not withhold at all on tuition payments
167. S.REP., supra note 160, at 102, 1978-3 C.B. at 400.
168. A "game" is "[a] contest for success or superiority in a trial of chance, skill or endurance," BALLEN~im's LAw DIcrIoNARY 513 (Sd ed. 1969), and a "sport" is "[a] game, pastime or diversion," id. at 1205. Cf. §114 & Reg. §1.114-1(d) (sports programs conducted for
the American National Red Cross).
The most troublesome word from a definitional standpoint will undoubtedly be the
word "hobby." In Walter Conner, 15 T.C.M. 1504 (CCH 1956), wherein the taxpayers were
seeking deductions relating to the expenses of raising Persian cats, the court defined
"hobby" as something undertaken "to stimulate their personal pleasure." Id. at 1505. See
Coffey v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 204, 205, 1954-1 U.S.T.C. 9233 (5th Cir. 1944) (objective
of hobby is pleasure or relaxation). A definition along these lines seems to carry out the
congressional intent. A definition which treats as a hobby any activity that is not business
or profit motivated would seem to be too narrow. But see I.R.C. §183 (deductions disallowed for expenses due to not for profit activities).
169. S. REP., supra note 160, at 100-01, 1978-3 C.B. at 398-99.
170. See text accompanying notes 156 & 157 supra.
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on the basis that, by definition, all courses maintain or improve skills required
by the present position. 17'
At the hearings on section 127, data was presented indicating a direct
relationship between income tax withholding practices on tuition assistance
and participation rates by employees in employer tuition-aid programs. Lower
paid employees, in particular, were found less likely to participate where they
2
received educational services but had cash withheld from their paychecks.17
Section 127 removes this disincentive to upward mobility through education.
Benefits excludable from income under this section are also excluded from
the definition of wages for purposes of withholding, unemployment, taxes
1 73
and social security taxes.
Nondiscrimination Requirements
It was clearly Congress' intent that such education programs be available
to a broad class of employees rather than to particular individuals. 7 4 Therefore, a qualified program must meet nondiscrimination requirements. The
section requires that a program must benefit employees who qualify under a
classification set up by the employer and found by the Service 75 not to discriminate in favor of employees who are owners (shareholders or self-employed
individuals), officers, highly compensated employees, or dependents of any of
these groups. 76 Employees may, however, be excluded from a program if they
are members of a collective bargaining unit and there is evidence that educational assistance benefits were the subject of good faith bargaining between
the unit and the employer offering the program. 177 Moreover, the section
provides that a program shall not be considered discriminatory merely because
the different types of educational assistance made available under the program
are utilized to a greater degree by one class of employees than by another
class.' 78 Additionally, no discrimination will be found if reimbursement is
171. 124 CONG. REc. S30 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Javits accompanying
introduction of S. 2388).
172. Employee Education Assistance Programs:Hearings on S.2388 before the Subcomm.
on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
18 (statement of Dr. Donald G. Garrison) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 3.2388].
173. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600 (1978) (amending I.R.C. §§3401(a), 3121(a),
3306(b)).
174. S.R P.,supra note 160, at 102, 1978-3 C.B. at 400, involved primarily the design and
testing of electronic circuits, not making decisions of a managerial nature.
175. An employer educational assistance program is not required to be approved in
advance by the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
176. I.R.C. §127(b)(2). Presumably the dependents referred to in I.R.C. §127(b)(2) are
those who are also employees, since the program must be for the exclusive benefit of em-

ployees. See I.R.C. §127(b)(1).

Actual utilization of benefits will cause disqualification of the program if more than
five percent of the amounts paid or incurred by the employer for educational assistance
during the year are provided to shareholders, owners or their spouses or dependents, each
of whom on any day of the year owns more than five percent of the stock or of the
capital or profits interest in the employer.
177.
178.

I.R.C. §127(b)(2).
I.R.C. §127(b)(3). The Senate Report states that a program is discriminatory "if
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conditional on successful completion of a course or attainment of a particular
17 9
course grade.
To aid in ensuring that eligible employees take advantage of the educational assistance available to them, the section requires that there be a separate
written plan so and that reasonable notification of the availability and terms
of the plan be given to such employees.' 8 ' Moreover, the plan must not provide
eligible employees with a choice between educational assistance and cash or
any other remuneration includable in gross income.282 While future regulations
and rulings 83 under this section will be needed to flesh out some of the details
of the nondiscrimination requirements, Congress has not left much room to
structure a discriminatory plan which unduly favors owners or highly compensated employees.
Significance of Section 127
Even before the enactment of section 127, employer-financed educational
programs for employees were quite common. 84 The enactment of section 127
exempting such educational benefits from an employee's income should, in
most cases, result in even more widespread adoption of such plans and in
greater employee participation.'8 5 In particular, minorities, women and lower
eschelon employees will no longer be disinclined to participate because of
the adverse income tax effect of obtaining education which might qualify
more than 5% of the benefits can be paid to shareholders, officers, highly compensated
employees, self-employed individuals or dependents of any of these groups." S. REP.,
supra note 160, at 102, 1978-3 C.B. at 400. The Conference Report also states that this five
percent rule includes officers and highly compensated employees. Conf. Rept. at 217 Section
127(b)(3) states that the five percent limitation only applies to shareholders and owners and
only those with a more than five percent interest in the company. Section 127(c)(4) provides
that stock ownership is determined by application of the attributions rules of I.R.C. §1563(d)

and (e), but without application of I.R.C. §1563(e)(3)(C). Consequently, stock owned by a
qualified employees' trust is subject to attribution. Regulations are to be issued to determine
ownership in an unincorporated business based on principles similar to the attribution rules
applicable to corporate shareholders. I.R.C. §127(c)(4)(B).
179. I.R.C. §127(c)(5).
180. I.R.C. §127(b)(1).
181. I.R.C. §127(b)(6).
182. I.R.C. §127(b)(4).
183. It remains to be seen to what extent concepts and standards from the Qualified
Employee Benefit Plan area, I.R.C. §§401-415, and from the recently enacted legislation dealing with Qualified Group Legal Services Plans, I.R.C. §120, are adopted under I.R.C. §127.

For example, the section does not state whether benefits may be provided in proportion to
salary.
184. Hearings on S.2388, supra note 172, at 20. J. Boglioli quoted from LusrmxAN,
EDUCATION IN INDUSTRY (Conference Board Research Report No. 719, 1977): "Tuition-aid
programs are virtually omnipresent among all classes of companies with 1,000 or more employees. Even in the 500 to 999 employees category, they are present in 82 percent of the
firms.... Companies with 500 or more employees spent about $225 million on tuition-aid
reimbursement in 1974-75."

185. The employer should be able to deduct the cost of such a plan as an ordinary
and necessary business expense under I.R.C. §162. The legislation had the support of
unions, employers, the Civil Service Commission and educational institutions. See generally
Hearings on S.2388, supra note 172.
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them for advancement. This major goal for enacting section 127 probably will
be accomplished. 8 , At the professional level, accounting firms and other
business firms should be able to provide tuition assistance to employees to
enable them to obtain advanced degrees, such as a Masters of Business Administration, even though this might qualify them for a new trade or business
within the firm or in some other field. Banks, insurance companies, and
other businesses should be able to pay for law school courses for employees
which relate to the business of the employer even though they are part of a
program of study qualifying the employee to become a lawyer.1 87 A law firm
should be able to pay for a new employee's bar review course.""' A law firm
could also provide tuition assistance to a new lawyer for the cost of obtaining
a Master of Law degree even though the education is undertaken before the
lawyer has engaged in the practice of law.18 9 Educational institutions can
provide tuition aid to employees which should be excludable from their income
even though the education is necessary to meet minimum requirements for
qualification as a teacher.1 0 The only requirement which would have to be
met for the education to be excludable from the employee's income in each of
the above examples is for the education in question to meet the nondiscrimination provisions of section 127.'1' Until regulations are promulgated on this
aspect of the section, it will be difficult to determine exactly what benefits
can be offered to higher paid and professional employees which are not available to employees generally.9 2 Section 127 is applicable to tax years beginning
after December 31, 1978 and before January 1, 1984,193 perhaps so that
Congress can analyze the section's effect to better determine the actual revenue
9
loss caused by its enactment.' '
CONCLUSION

Senator Packwood, in introducing Senate Bill 2388, which later became
section 127, stated that a major purpose of the bill was to "clarify a confusing
186. 124 CON.. Rac. S29 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Packwood accompanying introduction of S.2388).
187. Of course, the exclusion provided by I.R.C. §127 is not limited to job-related
studies. If the employer chose to send the employee through a full law school program, the
cost of such a program would also be excludable by the employee under I.R.C. §127.
188. Outside of I.R.C. §127 such a payment would be income to the employee and not
deductible by him. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2), ex. 3.
189. For a contrary result where the taxpayer pays his own educational costs under
these circumstances, see cases cited at note 28 supra.
190. Outside of I.R.C. §127 such a payment would be income to the employee and
not deductible by him. Reg. §l.162-5(b)(2)(i).
191. I.R.C. §127(b)(2), (3).
192. In particular, the fact that §127(b)(3) says that more than five percent shareholders
or owners cannot receive more than five percent of the benefits under the plan during the
year, while the Committee Reports state that this rule also includes officers and highly
compensated employees, will have to be clarified. See note 178 supra.
193. I.R.C. §127(d); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600 §164(d), 92 Stat. 2814 (1978).
194. S. REP. at 103, 1978-3 C.B. at 400. The estimated reduction in calendar year liabilities was $26 million in 1979, $29 million in 1980, and $40 million in 1983. Id.
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and ambiguous area of the law."19 5 Section 127 should achieve this goal for
education provided under a qualified Education Assistance Program. As previously noted, section 127 does nothing to clarify this area of the law with
regard to the deductibility of the individually incurred costs of education. 198
Furthermore, educational assistance provided by the employer but not covered
by section 127 will be excluded from an employee's income only if it would
have met the tests for a deduction had the employee paid for the education
himself or had it qualified as a scholarship. However, the scholarship provision
does not exclude from income educational benefits which are primarily compensatory and therefore plays a very minor role in an employer-employee
setting. The exclusion for scholarships is mainly restricted to educational grants

by disinterested grantors.U7
Comprehensive legislation dealing with the tax treatment of the costs of
education seems the optimum solution. To date, Congress has not chosen to
do this. Congress does appear to be dissatisfied with the current state of the
law under Regulation §1.162-5 as evidenced by the enactment of section 127.
If comprehensive legislation is not forthcoming, some liberalization of the
rules regarding the deductibility of educational expenses seems to be called
for. This need has been accentuated by the enactment of section 127, creating
a disparity between employer-financed education and education financed by
an individual."""
195. 124 CONG. RFc. S29 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978).
196. I.R.C. §127 is not to be construed to affect the deduction or inclusion in income of
amounts not within the exclusion under this section. I.R.C. §127(c)(6). In addition, no deduction is allowed under any other section for any amount excluded from income by reason
of §127, thus preventing a double tax benefit. I.R.C. §127(c)(7).
197. See text accompanying notes 133-155 supra.
198. Even if the deduction for educational expenses is brought in line with the exclusion
of educational benefits under I.R.C. §127, both are still subject to the criticism that those
with the highest incomes will receive the greatest benefit under either a deduction or an
exclusion mechanism.
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